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Building Institutional Capacity: Knowledge Production for Transnational 
Security Governance in Mexico 
 
Abstract 
This article engages with institutionalist-knowledge production in US-Mexican security 
relations, demonstrating how anti-crime governance in the Americas has shifted from a 
heavy-handed military rationale to a good governance and civil society-centred approach. 
This shift has been facilitated by the newly emerging resilience discourse which 
advocates turning local communities from passive beneficiaries of government-sponsored 
law enforcement into pro-active security partners. It will be argued that the rise of good 
governance and society-centred policy thinking has enhanced the epistemic authority of a 
heterogeneous, but ideologically aligned set of human rights advocacy groups, think 
tanks, policy-oriented academics and for-profit development NGOs—both in Mexico and 
the United States. This transnational expert community has been instrumental in inserting 
the issue of drug-related violent crime in Mexico into a globally dominant statebuilding 
framework. In consequence, security governance in Mexico has taken on a more 
transnational character and become the object of a highly-intrusive international 
monitoring regime. 
 
Keywords: intervention, statebuilding, Mexico, security governance, organized crime 
 
Word count: 8434 
 
Introduction 
This article reconstructs how international policy discourse about governing drug-related 
organized crime in the Americas has evolved from a traditional War on Drugs logic—centred 
on supply interdiction and militarized law enforcement—to a focus on promoting good 
governance and engaging civil society. It argues that by reorienting policy towards anti-
corruption, human rights and the rule of law as well as by including civil society as an active 
partner in security governance, Mexico has been integrated into an international statebuilding 
framework.1 In the wake, security governance in the country has been further 
transnationalized and the Mexican government has been put under increased external scrutiny. 
While international policy assistance might have provided the Mexican government with 
much needed military and policing capabilities, it has also raised the level of expectations in 
terms of protecting human rights and improving good governance. The analysis foregrounds 
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the role of US and Mexican advocacy groups, think tanks, policy-oriented academics and 
international human rights NGOs in catalysing this process. It sees Merida´s 
transnationalizing effect as complimenting preceding domestic strategies of 
internationalization which had emerged during the transition to democracy in the 1990s  and 
were directed at promoting human rights protection and transparency in public policy.2  The 
study builds on new empirical material gathered through field interviews in Washington, DC 
in February 2017 and Mexico City in October/November 2017 with US diplomats, security 
experts and advocacy groups. A wide range of official US documents has been used, 
including congressional hearings, USAID and congressional reports as well as internal cable 
reports by the US Embassy in Mexico City. 
 As the first section draws out, the escalation of drug-related organized crime has 
prompted the governments of Mexico and the United States in 2008 to significantly increase 
their level of security cooperation as part of the Merida Initiative.3 To be begin with, the 
Merida Initiative is important for financial reasons. In its first year of funding, the US 
Congress appropriated $440 million for the agreement, corresponding to the total amount of 
US security assistance to Mexico in the previous twelve years.4 It is now considered the 
‘centrepiece of the US Government´s security cooperation with Mexico’5. While the Mexican 
side was motivated primarily by concerns over US drug demand, policymakers in the United 
States supported the agreement out of fear that violence might ‘spill over’ into border areas.6 
The US rational of preventing ‘spill over’ has prompted both academics and policy 
commentators to critique the Merida Initiative for establishing a ‘North American security 
perimeter’7 or ‘expand[ing]’ NAFTA ‘into security’8. In contrast, the analysis in this article 
emphasizes how—driven by US and Mexican expert and advocacy knowledge—policy 
thinking evolved from a repressive military doctrine to a more sophisticated strategy aimed at 
improving civil society participation, good governance, the rule of law and anti-corruption. 
What was once considered a critical counter-discourse has become the new mainstream policy 
framework. The recently emerging resilience discourse has facilitated this paradigm shift, as 
section two discusses.9 It draws out how the resilience discourse emphasises the need for local 
communities to actively participate in enforcing the law. Importantly, although the resilience 
discourse presents local residents as ʻin the driver´s seat’—underlining the critical importance 
of their knowledge and agency—the ultimate goal is to strengthen government control. In this 
way, the resilience discourse may be situated within a preceding and larger concern with 
institutional capacity. The final section elaborates on the way in which good governance 
promotion and civil society participation in the Merida Initiative have helped to place Mexico 
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‘in the focus of international commentators—including journalists, academics, politicians, 
security practitioners and members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)’10. In 
particular, international, US and Mexican NGOs and advocacy groups have joined forces with 
the US government in monitoring and evaluating the Mexican government´s human rights 
record. This heterogeneous, but ideologically cohered set of actors is now routinely engaging 
with the most intimate affairs of Mexican security governance, such as the authority of the 
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH). It would appear as if, through the Merida 
Initiative, Mexico has given up a long-standing foreign policy tradition based on national 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus, apart from raising the US budget for security 
assistance to Mexico, the Merida Initiative has been important for reshaping international 
governance efforts against drug-related organized crime and violence in North America 
because through it the Mexican political elite effectively gave up ‘claims of legal equality and 
autonomy in internal affairs’11. What has taken its place is a new ‘sense of collaboration and 
joint solution of problems’12. Traditional forms of bilateral cooperation have been sidelined 
and security governance has taken on a decidedly transnational character. In the process, 
international expectations vis-à-vis the Mexican government to fulfil its human rights and 
good governance obligations have grown. While this process has been driven by both 
domestic and international actors, this article focuses on the external dimension. It argues that 
an institutionally diverse, but ideologically cohered set of international actors has contributed 
to the transnationalization of security governance in Mexico. Similarly, the article does not 
claim that the Merida Initiative effectively moved Mexican security policy from law 
enforcement to good governance. Rather, it argues that the Merida Initiative provided an 
alliance of national and international producers of institutionalist knowledge with an 
opportunity to entrench their discursive authority and place Mexican security governance 
under increased outside scrutiny.    
 
The Merida Initiative: From the War on Drugs to Good Governance 
Since the mid-2000s, drug-related organized crime in Mexico has escalated radically, 
attracting widespread international attention.13 Especially during the presidency of Felipe 
Calderón, homicide rates ‘spiked dramatically’ from 10,452 in 2006 to 27,669 in 2011: ‘No 
other country in the hemisphere has seen such a large increase in the number or rate of 
homicides over the last decade’.14 During Calderón´s time in office 121,669 people were 
killed—more than 55 per day—most of them in instances related to organized crime.15 In 
reaction to this development, in October 2008, the Mexican and US governments engaged in 
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an historically unprecedented degree of security cooperation as part of the Merida Initiative. 
Initially conceived as a $1.4 billion US assistance programme, the Merida Initiative ‘has 
become the cornerstone of US-Mexico security cooperation’16. In a ‘situation of growing 
ungovernability’17 the Mexican government considered increased collaboration with the 
United States an acute necessity. According to the Mexican Foreign Office, the key motive 
behind the rapprochement was that ‘the challenges that Mexico confronts are to a large extent 
expressions and results of phenomena which occur beyond [its] borders’18, by which it was 
referring to the role of US demand in sustaining illegal drug markets. As for the United States, 
the immediate concern was ‘spill-over’, i.e. the desire to ‘make sure that potential threats are 
stopped in Mexico well before they reach US borders or communities’19. At the time, 
Representative Gene Green was a prominent spokesperson for those in Congress who feared 
that violence in Mexico might cross over into the United States and, therefore, needed to be 
contained: 
 
Whatever Mexico has been doing in their country is actually protecting those of us in 
Texas and California [...], because if they slow that situation down or win that battle, it 
makes our citizens and our people a lot safer. [...] Whatever they do in their own country 
to take care of this problem will make us safer in our own.20  
 
The US rationale of preventing ‘spill over’ is closely related to the critique of the Merida 
Initiative as establishing a ‘North American security perimeter’21. For example, Paul Ashby 
has opposed the Merida Initiative for reflecting a strategic interest on the part of the United 
States to ‘sustain[...] an open economically integrated investment environment in the NAFTA 
zone’22. Similarly, Richard Coughlin has argued that US policy engagement under the Merida 
Initiative serves to ‘maintain[...] economic liberalization while managing the security risks 
that go along with it’23. It is a process of ‘ordering societies that have been disordered by 
neoliberal economic restructuring’24. In the advocacy realm, Laura Carlsen has popularised 
this perspective, arguing that Merida ‘officially expanded’ NAFTA ‘into security’25. For 
Carlsen, the two-fold goal of the Merida Initiative is to place Mexican security institutions 
‘under closer US control and surveillance and to protect investment and business throughout 
the region’26. This critique seems well-founded. For example, former US Assistant Secretary 
of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon pointed out that North America 
was ‘a shared economic space’ and that as such ‘we need to protect it’ beyond ‘our frontiers’: 
‘To a certain extent, we´re armouring NAFTA’27. Or, as leading Mexican policy analyst and 
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former National Security Advisor Sigrid Arzt put it, ‘[t]he future of US-Mexico national 
security cooperation should be looking at consolidating a scheme similar to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, in which security cooperation would be well-established 
and institutionalized’28. 
 While the academic discussion of the Merida Initiative has so far dealt with how it 
might serve US strategic and economic interests, this paper foregrounds the peculiar 
coincidence of policymakers, advocacy groups, think tanks and policy-oriented academics in 
critiquing the traditional War on Drugs approach—with its emphasis on supply interdiction 
and door-busting law enforcement—and in demanding a ‘more holistic and long-term security 
strategy’29. From its very beginning, human rights NGOs, like Centro ProDH, had opposed 
the Merida Initiative for ‘reinforc[ing] a dysfunctional public security paradigm based on 
militarization and the use of force’30. What is striking about this well-worn critique is the 
extent to which it is now shared by main-stream policy thinkers, both in the United States and 
Mexico. For instance, research at the US Army War College argues that a repressive military 
strategy is ineffective: ‘Hammering the problem like a nail won´t work’31. Fighting 
sophisticated illegal networks with crude military force ‘will only distort the problem, escalate 
risks and costs and change the entire equation’; it will actually ‘make things worse’32. As John 
Walsh from the influential Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) put it in an 
interview with the author, ‘the energy [of] the War on Drugs has certainly dissipated’33. What 
has taken its place is a new willingness to ‘recognize the complicated realities of Mexico´s 
drug war and the limitations of military hardware in changing the tide’34. 
 In line with this pervasive critique, US policy underwent a major shift in early 2010. 
As part of the Beyond Merida strategy, US assistance moved from professionalizing Mexican 
counterdrug forces to ‘addressing [...] weak institutions and underlying societal problems’35. 
If Merida had started as a ‘fairly straightforward foreign assistance program with a focus on 
equipment purchases’, it was turning into a ‘much broader security partnership’36, involving 
efforts to sustain the rule of law, promote respect for human rights, build strong institutions 
and increase civil society participation.37 Rather than narrowly conceived technical assistance, 
Merida´s policy discourse began to revolve around improving Mexican state-society relations 
and ‘offer[ing] direct support to society itself’38. This transformation was animated by an 
awareness of socio-cultural context and ‘root causes’39. It was increasingly understood that 
US policy action did not ‘operate in a vacuum’40 and that ‘Mexico´s problems are exceedingly 
complex and deep-seated’41 which is why ‘any real solution to these problems will have to be 
no less encompassing’42. According to this view, the paramilitary power of the cartels and 
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‘operational deficiencies’43 of the Mexican police and justice system were merely the 
symptoms of a larger malaise ‘extending into numerous realms of Mexican governance’44 45. 
Paradigmatically, in a flagship publication by the Wilson Center´s Mexico Institute on Shared 
Responsibility leading policy analysts Eric Olson, David Shirk and Andrew Selee claimed that 
institutional reform to improve transparency and accountability would have to cover ‘all 
aspects of Mexico´s governing apparatus’46. Crucially, the Beyond Merida policy change first 
introduced the resilience discourse into US-Mexican relations and security governance in 
Mexico.47 
It bears special emphasis that the Beyond Merida consensus remains fragile. As Eric Olson 
pointed out in an interview with the author in 2010: ‘Still there is enormous pressure in 
Congress to see this narrowly as a security issue that is about support to law enforcement and 
the military. All this rethinking [...] is very vulnerable […]’48. And David Shirk saw Merida´s 
good governance focus as limited to the Obama administration.49 In addition, it needs to be 
stressed that Merida´s influence on Mexican domestic politics is circumscribed. As well-
known defence expert Raúl Benítez pointed out, there is comparatively ‘little money’ 
involved to ‘affect [Mexican] sovereignty’50. Thus, there is still a strong tendency in Mexico 
to see public security issues from a traditional law and order perspective. However, this study 
argues that the Merida Initiative significantly changed US-Mexican security discourse and 
helped consolidate the authority of institutionalist knowledge production. 
 
Community Resilience in Mexico as International Statebuilding  
The resilience discourse figures prominently in key US government documents on Mexico, 
such as USAID´s Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014-2018 51, and has become 
hugely productive in cohering US-Mexican governance knowledge.52 In stark contrast to the 
heavy-handed policies of the War on Drugs, community resilience—broadly understood as 
the social cohesion and vitality of neighbourhoods, families and other small-scale groups—is 
today considered ‘really important and fundamental’53. In an edited volume on Building 
Resilient Communities in Mexico, it is presented more precisely as the ‘capacity for society to 
withstand and recover from hazards, stresses and shocks’54. This Wilson Center publication 
demonstrates how improving security governance necessarily entails a more pro-active part 
for civil society. Arguing against the ‘natural tendency’55 to turn exclusively to government 
agencies, Georgetown University professor Daniel Sabet claims that the ‘role of ordinary, 
everyday citizens’56 in addressing security problems is often neglected. In Sabet´s view, 
security is not a public good that can be produced by state officials and consumed by the 
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citizenry: ‘Instead it is necessary for citizens to play a role in the ‘production process’’57. 
Security needs to be ‘‘co-produced’’58. In the contributions to this widely cited volume, the 
call for more ‘robust civic responses’59 to crime and violence is intimately linked to the idea 
of governing security through a public private partnership. Community resilience is really 
about setting free the ‘potential for collaboration’60 between state agencies, local citizens and 
civil society organisations in providing security. Here, the main role of the community is to 
support state agencies on the ground by providing operational information. Importantly, in the 
resilience discourse the local community figures as both the source of the problem and its 
solution. While it is clear that effective and legitimate policy action has to be ‘directed and 
monitored by communities themselves’61, it is equally apparent that resilience needs to be 
‘buil[t]’ deliberately through ‘complex, multidisciplinary and long-term’62 (international) 
interventions. Hence, the proposition to make local communities ‘equal partners’63 rings 
rather hollow because this is a framework to ‘incentivis[e]’64 appropriate responses and 
‘construct[...] [...] autonomy’65. Put differently, the resilience discourse places the ‘burden’66 
of developing viable coping strategies onto local residents, at the same time as it opens up the 
way for comprehensive, long-term (international) policy involvement. What is more, in this 
joint venture, the state engages with the local population in a purely instrumental way 
‘harnessing [its] insights, knowledges and capacities’67. The ultimate goal remains enhancing 
government capacity.68 The reasoning behind acknowledging ‘more complex human 
realities’69 and ‘start[ing] from the necessities and problematics of each community’70 is to 
‘enlist the community’71 in a routinised exchange of ‘information gathering and problem 
solving’72 between security forces and the populace. In this way, ‘‘soft-side’’73 policy 
programmes working on Mexico´s ‘weak social fabric’74 reflect an internationally sponsored 
statebuilding project and, thus, may be located within a broader concern with institutional 
capacity.  
 The notion of Mexican state capacity has been central to the policy debate on public 
security in Mexico and US assistance to improve it. According to Raúl Benítez, policy elites 
in Washington DC and Mexico City tend to agree on the ‘centrality of state capacity’75 in 
ameliorating Mexico´s security situation. In fact, Benítez strongly foregrounds this issue in 
his own writings, claiming that ‘the weakness of security, intelligence and defence institutions 
in the region has had a clear winner: organized crime’76. In so doing, Benítez´ work has been 
key for creating a popular perception of violence and homicides in Latin America as 
‘indicators of governability and government efficiency’77. For example, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has argued that international drug trafficking could 
8 
 
‘easily [take] hold in Mexico against a backdrop of weak, corrupt police forces and judicial 
institutions’78. Here, it is the existence of ‘ungoverned or poorly governed areas’79 which 
attracts organized crime; rather than organized crime undermining state institutions. In this 
perspective, building effective and legitimate institutions appears as the ‘core [...] challenge’80 
in fighting organized crime. In so doing, the institutionalist analysis systematically obscures 
the role of US drug demand in sustaining organized crime in Mexico.81 
 In the wake, security governance in Mexico has been articulated as a statebuilding 
problematic according to which ‘Mexican institutional weakness’ constitutes ‘a menace to 
regional security’82—an ‘emerging risk[...] to international order’.83 The escalated variant of 
this discourse—‘state failure’—caused major diplomatic turmoil in 2008 and 2009 when the 
US Joint Forces Command warned of Mexico´s (possible) ‘rapid and sudden collapse’84 and 
(former) SOUTHCOM commander and White House Drug ‘Czar’ General McCaffrey saw 
Mexico ‘on the road to becoming a failed state’85. Again, internationally renowned 
commentators echoed this view. For instance, George Friedman spoke of the ‘serious 
possibility of a failed state in Mexico’86. And Ted Carpenter asserted in his popular science 
book The Fire Next Door that Mexico was about to turn into ‘a Latin American version of 
Somalia’87. The government of Mexico was quick to ‘set[...] the record straight’88 through a 
public relations campaign that argued that Mexico had a ‘functioning state’89 and, therefore, a 
‘relatively low risk profile’90. Similarly, debates in the US Congress about applying a counter-
insurgency logic to Mexico did not take root. In 2011, at a ‘coincidence in time’91 with 
problems in Afghanistan and Iraq, former Representative Connie Mack was at the forefront of 
an attempt to reframe security governance in Mexico in counter-insurgency terms.92 His 
proposal to apply a ‘completely different way of looking’93 at violence in Mexico was given 
purchase by practitioner academics like the editor of the Small Wars Journal Robert Bunker 
who suggested that Mexican cartel activity qualified as a criminal insurgency.94 In this case, 
the US expert community—cohering around the Wilson Center95—successfully reoriented the 
debate onto a good governance agenda. As Eric Olson said in an interview with the author, 
the insurgency debate ‘has died out, thankfully’. Olson explained that 
 
the notion that you can adopt a war [and counter-insurgency] motive to address all these 
problems is really mistaken. [...] It mostly comes from people with a defence and 
intelligence background who are not Latin Americanists. [...] The people who were 
strongest about that were not Latin Americanists. They were taking an experience from 




What matters here is how the resilience discourse as well as the controversies surrounding 
‘state failure’ and ‘criminal insurgency’ in Mexico have entrenched an international policy 
discourse on institutional (in-) capacity, strengthening the political leverage of an 
ideologically aligned set of advocacy groups, think tanks and policy-oriented academics. As 
the next section demonstrates, this process has helped transnationalize security governance in 
the country and boosted international expectations. 
 
Transnationalizing Security Governance in Mexico: Raising International Expectations 
The key consequence of policy discourse zooming in on Mexican institutional capacity is that 
it undermined notions of ‘absolute state sovereignty’97. The fact that the Mexican government 
had to openly ‘recognize [its] incapacity to face up to a threat’98 facilitated a questioning of 
long-standing foreign policy doctrine: ‘In other times it would have been difficult, because 
Mexican public opinion perceived that cooperating with the United States on security issues 
could undermine national sovereignty’99. In this sense, Merida represented a major 
‘ideological evolution’100. And it was not lost on US policymakers. Thomas Shannon 
welcomed the Merida Initiative because the Mexicans were ‘asking [...] for assistance in a 
way that they have never asked for assistance before’ and were ‘prepared to coordinate [...] 
with us in a way that they have never coordinated before’101. According to Shannon, Mexico 
‘had never opened itself up to this kind of dialogue’, ‘never proposed this kind of 
cooperation’102. He showed himself pleased with the fact that US policy had ‘finally broken 
through some longstanding taboos’103 and that Mexico was willing to embark on ‘a deeper, 
different kind of relationship’104.  
 This dramatic departure in the bilateral relationship was perceived as an 
‘unprecedented opportunity’105 to influence Mexican reform efforts, in terms of policy and 
specific cases. Increased ‘engagement with civil society organizations’106 was an important 
element in this endeavour. In a cable report by the US Embassy, Mexican civil society figures 
as a ‘nascent force with significant but unrealized potential for bringing about needed social 
and political change’107. And in a human rights report to Congress, the State Department 
‘underscored’108 the relevance of working with Mexican civil society organizations. 
Conversely, international NGOs—working closely with Mexican advocacy groups—have 
used mandatory human rights reporting by the State Department to ‘press for measurable 
progress’109 by the Mexican government in preventing torture, increasing police 
accountability and abolishing separate military jurisdiction. In a controversial and 
internationally received report entitled Neither Rights Nor Security, Human Rights Watch saw 
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the conditions imposed by the US Congress on the Merida Initiative as a ‘key opportunity to 
measure Mexico´s human rights progress, and to pressure the Mexican government to address 
abusive practices’110. The Merida Initiative has brought international, US and Mexican NGOs 
together with the US Department of State in a common effort to monitor and evaluate the 
Mexican government´s human rights performance. The US Embassy, for instance, ‘consults 
regularly’ with local NGOs and civil society organizations and has established a working 
group to ‘build[...] trust and strengthen[...] dialogue’ between the Mexican government and 
NGOs to ‘reduce hostility [...] [and] identify[...] benchmarks and joint Government of 
Mexico-NGO mechanisms to track and measure progress on human rights complaints and 
cases’111. Similarly, both the US Department of State and international human rights NGOs, 
like Human Rights Watch, have lobbied for strengthening specific Mexican state institutions. 
In this context, the National Human Rights Commission (Commisión Nacional de Derechos 
Humanos, CNDH) has been particularly popular. In one of the few instances in which US 
funds were actually held back due to negative human rights reporting, the US Department of 
State wanted to ‘strengthen CNDH´s enforcement authority’112. And Human Rights Watch 
paid special attention to CNDH in Neither Rights Nor Security, lamenting that ‘[t]oo often the 
commission[...]´s proven capacity is not put to use’113. 
 Merida´s human rights regime illustrates how US intervention has contributed to a 
project of state transnationalization in Mexico.114 In this project, traditional diplomatic 
channels are circumvented and US agencies ‘engage[...] in direct liaison with experts across 
the board’115. New actors make their way into Mexican national security decision-making—
the US Congress, the US military, civil society, and the state governments of the southern 
United States.116 It would seem that through this process Mexico has become the object of 
much international policy and advocacy attention. As Benítez rightly points out, the 
promoters as well as the critics of the Merida Initiative ‘have raised the level of expectations 
of Mexico’117. If this is indeed the case, Mexico might be moving along the same trajectory 
that Graham Harrison projected for the ‘governance states’ of sub-Sahara Africa—although in 
the opposite direction.118 Rather than becoming a ‘responsible sovereignty’, in the future 
Mexico might be seen as having an increasingly problematic sovereignty.119 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the Merida Initiative, this article has argued that US policy thinking on drug-
related organized crime and violence in the Americas has moved from a repressive military 
model to an emphasis on improving governance and including civil society. Heavily promoted 
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by US and Mexican advocacy groups, think tanks, policy-oriented academics and security 
experts, good governance and society-centred security provision have become the new policy 
mainstream. To be sure, large amounts of US funding continue to be dedicated to 
counternarcotics aid and mano dura policies are hugely popular in many Latin American 
countries. Thus, US security discourse and policy practice remain diverse. However, this 
article has tried to draw out how good governance and civil society-oriented security 
frameworks have been gaining traction through international policy endeavours like the 
Merida Initiative. In particular, the resilience discourse has propelled this shift by claiming 
that government efforts to enforce the law on their own are insufficient and need the active 
input of the population.120 Importantly, although the resilience discourse underscores the 
relevance of local knowledge and agency, it is fundamentally geared towards increasing 
government control.121 Seen from this perspective, the resilience discourse may be situated 
within a wider interest in Mexican institutional capacity. Calls for local ownership and 
bottom-up policy formulation are actually about refining state social control. The ulterior 
motive is to ‘enlist the community’122 in enforcing the law. The rise of good governance and 
civil society policy has brought the non-state producers of security knowledge on both sides 
of the border closer together. It has reinforced the working relationship between key 
Washington-based think tanks and human rights NGOs, such as the Wilson Center´s Mexico 
Institute and the Washington Office on Latin America, and Mexican advocacy groups such as 
Centro ProDH. The Merida Initiative has offered this set of actors an unprecedented 
opportunity to influence not only US security policy, but also issues in Mexico which were 
previously off-limits, including the improvement of human rights protection, the reform of the 
security apparatus and the abolishment of military jurisdiction. Through his process, security 
governance in Mexico has been further transnationalized and the Mexican government has 
been put under increased international scrutiny. It would appear as if through the Merida 
Initiative—and the rise of good governance and civil society-centred knowledge production—
Mexico has been incorporated into a highly intrusive international statebuilding dispositive. 
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